

NSC REVIEW  
COMPLETED.

31 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting, 2 p.m., 31 July

Present were: Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Chairman; Mr. Alexis Johnson (State) *Mr. Gilpatric* and Mr. William Bundy for Defense; General Carter for CIA; and Mr. Tom Parrott as secretary.

1. Dr. McMillan briefed the Special Group (5412) on the results of the satellite program in FY 63 and the proposed program for FY 64 as presently contained in the proposed NRO budget. He indicated that three [ ] missions had been postponed for budgetary reasons and that this would increase the cyclical rate to a 45-day schedule rather than a 40-day schedule. He discussed in broad detail the purposes of CORONA, CORONA-M, CORONA-J, LANYARD, and [ ] and indicated the Soviet coverage that was available to date. Bundy said that the most important thing the Air Force does nowadays is satellite reconnaissance and questioned whether we were doing everything we should and using all the money we needed. McMillan indicated that he had squeezed the onion dry and that the only way to put more money into the program was to establish some new requirements and then go back to the Congress for additional appropriations. Gilpatric said he would take another look at the program to see if more could be done in the way of acquiring DOD funds and that he felt that if we had a redundancy any place, it should be in this program. The Special Group was generally most enthusiastic with the results of the satellite photography and expressed the opinion that we should do everything to foster and maintain an on-going program of high intensity.

2. The monthly reconnaissance forecasts were discussed. Secretary Johnson indicated that the only requirement for standing down U-2 flights in the Far East were those which were deep penetrations toward the Soviet Union such as the [ ] flight, that normal coastal peripheral flights, [ ] and flights in the Southeast Asia area were of no concern while Mr. Rusk was in Moscow and that we could go ahead on those flights. Also, no concern was expressed over any of the

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Laos flights even though they went below the 17th parallel. The DOD peripheral reconnaissance schedule for August was approved with the exception of [ ] which must await Mr. Rusk's return, and the [ ] flight which must not take place before August 12 (presumably the date of Rusk's return). All other flights by DOD were approved.

3. I reported on high-level coverage of Cuba and gave SAC a very favorable report on their performance. This was done in the presence of Dr. McMillan and Colonel Steakley.

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4. As to the [ ] and border areas, I presented a very brief discussion of the situation and our recommended lines of action. Mr. [ ] supported me and expanded on my views by repeating the Director's admonitions given at USIB as to tying together our relationships with the [ ] and requiring them to play the game with us 100%. As it stands on this item, there appears to be no need for any emergency action at this stage and we should report to Special Group next week what our visiting team has found out as to the base situation and as to [ ] authority to operate therefrom. 25X1

5. The Special Group approved Annex A to Enclosure A of the Memorandum for Special Group (CI) on action of the third country personnel in paramilitary operations. This approval incorporated into the Annex as a statement of Special Group policy the following:

"In view of the political connotations surrounding U. S. employment and support of third country nationals in paramilitary operations, each such proposal, either for overt or covert action, or a combination of the two, will be submitted by the proposer(s) prior to execution, for policy approval by the Special Group (5412)."

In view of the Special Group approval without substantive discussion of the CIA position, I did not introduce any proposal to revise NSAM #57. The timing of such a drastic move must be delicately handled and I am inclined to think may occur when the Special Group next considers the proposed program in the light of the foregoing policy decision. This should be kept in mind and we should be prepared to move in rapidly with our proposed rewrite of NSAM 57. If nothing occurs in the next three or four months, we should reconsider this position with a view to initiating action on this matter.

6. The briefing on CIA Training activities by Mr. Baird was postponed.

7. The CIA paper on the covert action program [ ] for FY 64 was presented by Mr. Karamessines and was approved.

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8. The CIA review of the political action program [ ] was approved without discussion.

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9. The minutes were not discussed.

10. There was a great rush to bring the meeting to an early close to meet a requirement of Mr. Johnson to leave by 3:30. This appears to be a good ploy to get things through the Special Group -- load the agenda far beyond the competence of the group to thoroughly analyze the problems, and then create a reason for early adjournment but in the meantime insisting on action on all agenda items!

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11. I did not get the opportunity to bring up our Cuban operations for July 63 nor to report the roll-up of one of our teams.

13. I did not get an opportunity to take up the question of the newly developed COMOR reconnaissance requirements for the current contingency in the Far East as discussed at USIB today. This paper should be circulated to 5412 members and handled on an individual-clearance basis.

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Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director

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